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UNIFORM RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
Granting An Obligor Section Six
Jurisdiction In A Responding State
On An Ex Parte Basis
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose here is to examine a conflict in judicial interpreta-
tions of the extradition provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act of 19521 and to suggest an appropriate
solution. The question raised is whether an obligor-defendant
charged with the crime of desertion or nonsupport in a demanding
state can defeat extradition by submitting to the jurisdiction of a
court in a responding state and complying with that court's sup-
port order. Section 52 of the Support Act, expanding upon the
Uniform Extradition Act,' provides for extradition of any person
'UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 5-6
(1952), 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 12, 23-25 (1957). The corresponding
Nebraska sections are NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-705, -706 (Reissue 1960).
These sections were not changed by the 1957 amendment to NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 42-701 to -721 (Reissue 1960).
To avoid confusion, reference will be made to Sections 5 and 6 of
the Support Act rather than to specific state statutes, as all the states
enacting the Uniform Act adopted its language virtually verbatim.
2 This section provides: "The Governor of this state (1) may demand
from the Governor of any other state the surrender of any person found
in such other state who is charged in this state with the crime of failing
to provide for the support of any person in this state and (2) may sur-
render on demand by the Governor of any other state any person found
in this state who is charged in such other state with the crime of failing
to provide for the support of a person in such other state. The provisions
for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply to any
such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was
not in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime
and although he had not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath
nor any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state
or show that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from
justice, or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the de-
manding or other state." 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 12, 23 (1957).
3 Cf. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 258 (1957).
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charged with desertion or nonsupport in the demanding state at
the time of the crime's commission and even if he has not fled
from justice. Whether or not the obligor-defendant Can defeat
extradition under Section 5 depends upon the interpretation of
Section 6 of the Support Act, which provides as follows: 4
Any' obligor contemplated by Section 5, who submits to thejurisdiction of the court of such other 'state and complies with the
court's order of support, shall be relieved of extradition for de-
sertion or nonsupport entered in the court of the state during the
period of such compliance.
As there have been no reported Nebraska decisions dealing
with Sections 5 and 6 of the Support Act, an analysis of the con-
flict among the courts is particularly pertinent. Particular em-
phasis will be given to a 1959 Oregon case, Lefler v. Lefler,5 which
granted jurisdiction (that is, the Court allowed the obligor to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court) to the obligor under Section
6 of the Support Act, thereby defeating extradition. There will
also be a brief resume of the background of the Support Act 6 and
of the intent of the drafters as set out in a number of sources.
II. BACKGROUND
The problem of interstate enforcement of support of deserted
dependants had been acute for many years.7 While there had
been attempts to solve this problem,8 no effective act was adopted
until the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
adopted the first Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
in 1950.9 The 1950 Support Act was an effort to extend the enforce-
4 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 12, 25 (1957) (Emphasis added).
5 344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
6 For general background material and information, see 9C UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 3 (1957); Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support:
A New Uniform Act Offers A Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951). (Professor
Brockelbank, a Professor of Law at the University of Idaho Law School,
is a Uniform Law Commissioner for the State of Idaho and chairman
of the Committee on Desertion and Nonsupport which drafted the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. He is considered the lead-
ing authority in the field.)
7 See the materials cited in note 6, supra.
8 See UNIFORM DESERTION AND SUPPORT ACT (1910), 10 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 1 (1922).
9 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 4 (1957). See Brockelbank, supra note 6.
See also 42 A.L.R.2d 761, 768-791 and Note, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 261(1956), for a complete discussion of reciprocal enforcement of support
acts and their development.
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ment of support duties by both criminal and civil sanctions. The
Support Act was further amended in 195210 and in 195811 by the
Uniform Law Commissioners. All states have adopted the 1952
Support Act, and. five have so far adopted the 1958 amendments
to the Support Act.12 Nebraska adopted the Support Act in 1951
and incorporated the amendments of the 1952 Support Act in
1957.13 Subsequent action in Nebraska is now desirable, as the 1958
amendments and additions of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws
are important.1
4
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
"The purposes of this act are to improve and extend by re-
ciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to
make uniform the law with respect thereto."' 5
The Support Act provides for a relatively inexpensive two-
state proceeding whereby the obligee 16 commences a suit in the
initiating state,17 the judge determines a duty of support, certifies
the record of such proceeding and sends it to the appropriate
109C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 28 (Supp. 1959).
11 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 28 (Supp. 1959). See Kelso, Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1959),
and Briggs, Need for Adoption of the 1958 Amendment to the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 20 MONT. L. REV. 40 (1958), for
detailed discussions of the 1958 Support Act.
12 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 28 (Supp. 1959).
13 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-701 to -721 (Reissue 1960).
14 See Kelso and Briggs, supra note 11, for a full explanation of the 1958
Support Act changes and provisions.
15 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 1
(1952). (All references to the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF SUPPORT ACT are found in 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
12-71) (1957).
16 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(8)
(1952): "'Obligee' means any person to whom a duty of support is
owed."
'7UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(2)(1952): "'Initiating state' means any state in which a proceeding pur-
suant to this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced."
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court in the responding state'8 where the obligor 19 is then living
or has property. The court in the responding state gains jurisdic-
tion of the obligor or his property and after a hearing, orders the
obligor to furnish support if the court finds a duty of support.20 By
using such a procedure the expense is minimized, due process is
preserved, and delay, to a large extent is eliminated.
21
The Support Act also provides for criminal procedures under
Sections 5 and 6. As pointed out above, Section 5 is designed "to
relieve the extradition process from the narrow requirements that
the person whose surrender is demanded must have been in the
demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and
must have fled from justice therefrom.' '22 This eliminates a serious
problem area that had proved almost insurmountable in previous
extradition cases involving the deserting obligor.
23
Section 6 is the focal point in the problem under consideration
and has been a source of conflict among the courts that have been
confronted with an obligor petitioning to be relieved from extradi-
tion. Section 6 was intended to provide "necessary relief from
extradition if the obligor complies with support orders of the state.
This is designed to encourage voluntary compliance which will be
more profitable to both states than the expensive procedure of
extradition. '24 However, the courts have not been uniform in their
interpretation of Section 6, thereby greatly reducing the benefits
of uniform reciprocal legislation.
18 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(3)
(1952): "'Responding state' means any state in which any proceeding
pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is or may be com-
menced."
19 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(7)
(1952): "'Obligor' means any person owing a duty of support."
209C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5 (1957).
21 Ibid. For a concise explanation of the entire procedural aspect, see
Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 13 (1952).
229C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5 (1957).
23 Ibid.
24Id. at 4 (1957).
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IV. COURT DECISIONS
Four appellate courts have been confronted with the interpre-
tation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Support Act.25 Two courts granted
jurisdiction,26 and two courts denied jurisdiction to the obligor
under Section 6.27 All four courts were interpreting identical stat-
utes28 and the facts giving rise to each case were substantially the
same. In each case the petitioner-obligor was asking the court in
the responding state to take jurisdiction of his case under Section
6 of the Support Act in an ex parte hearing, so that he might avoid
extradition for a criminal charge of nonsupport of his children
pending in the demanding state. Each petitioner-obligor contended
that the obligor could initiate proceedings in a court of the re-
sponding state, thereby voluntarily submitting to the court's
jurisdiction and upon compliance with that court's order of sup-
port, be relieved from extradition.
The California Court in Ex parte Floyd2 rejected the obligor's
contention, stating that the Support Act contemplates two distinct
courses of action in the enforcement of support duties: (1) extradi-
tion, and (2) the initiation of civil proceedings in the demanding
state with an opportunity to submit to the subsequently assumed
jurisdiction of the court in the responding state. The court in-
terpreted the word "such other state" in Section 6 to be the respond-
ing state and used the Support Act's definition of the responding
state: "any state in which any proceeding pursuant to the proceed-
ing in the initiating state is or may be commenced. 's0 The court
25 Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954);
Sands v. Sands, 60 Ohio Op. 181, 136 N.E.2d 747 (1956);
Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957);
Lefler v. Lefler, 344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
26 Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957);
Lefler v. Lefler, 344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
27 Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954); Sands v. Sands, 60
Ohio Op. 181, 136 N.E.2d 747 (1956).
28 The state versions of the Support Act interpreted by the four courts
that correspond to Sections 5 and 6, respectively, are as follows:
Ex parte Floyd: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, §§ 1660-61 (1955);
Sands v. Sands: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3115.04 (1953);
Jackson v. Hall: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 88.061-.071 (Supp. 1959);
Lefler v. Lefler: ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 110.051-.061 (1953).
The corresponding Nebraska sections are NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-705, -706
(Reissue 1960).
29 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954). See Notes, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 267
(1954); 24 U. CINC. L. REV. 139 (1955); 34 NEB. L. REV. 148 (1955).
30UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(3)
(1952) (Emphasis added).
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concluded that either extradition or initiation of civil proceedings
in the demanding state by the obligee or both of these courses
may be followed, that the election is wholly with the obligee and
the demanding state, and that the obligor may not independently
institute an action in the responding state for the purpose of de-
feating the extradition process.
The Ohio Court in Sands v. Sands31 also rejected the petitioner-
obligor's contention on basically the same grounds. In addition,
the court stated that the purpose of the Support Act was to facili-
tate extradition, not hinder it, and that Section 6 was designed to
prevent an obligee or the authorities in the initiating state from
extraditing an obligor, who was complying with a court order
of the responding state pursuant to the institution of the civil pro-
ceeding contemplated by the Support Act in the initiating state,
simply because the obligee or such authorities might not be satisfied
with the amount of support fixed by the responding state court.
But the Florida Court in Jackson v. Hall32 granted jurisdiction
under Section 6 of the Support Act to the petitioner-obligor. The
court felt that the "purpose" of the Support Act, in both its criminal
and civil enforcement aspects, was to compel the obligor to support
his dependents and not primarily to subject him to criminal punish-
ment for past offenses; and therefore, that there was no valid rea-
son for refusing jurisdiction, and if procedure was lacking for such
an action, the court would devise the necessary means to effectuate
"the purpose of the act."
In the principal case, Lefler v. Lefler,13 the court granted the
petitioner-obligor's request and held that the Oregon Courts had
jurisdiction of the obligor under Section 6. In defining the words
"such other state" in Section 6 as used in the phrase "any obligor
contemplated by Section 5, who submits to the jurisdiction of the
court of such other state . . ." the court stated that these words
mean the responding state because of the contextual meaning of
"obligor" in Section 5 which show that obligor is the one who is in
the responding state. In other words, "such other state" refers to
the asylum state to which the writ of extradition is directed. This
overlooks, however, the Support Act's definition of "responding
state" as pointed out in Ex parte Floyd.3 4 The Lefler court stated
that since it had jurisdiction, it would devise a procedure to vindi-
3160 Ohio Op. 181, 136 N.E.2d 747 (1956).
32 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957). See also 58 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1958).
33 344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
34 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820, 822 (1954).
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cate a "right" and to effect the "purpose of the Support Act," even
where no procedure had been provided by the Support Act.35 The
court considered the general policy arguments in favor of the
Support Act and concluded that there was no conceivable purpose
for Section 6 except to authorize the court in the responding state
to enter a support order upon the obligor's petition.3 6 It justified
its holding, at least in part, on the "intent of the drafters" by
stating:
It may be that the draftsmen of the Act, in recognition of the
fact that the families do not come to the critical juncture which
is portrayed in the plaintiff's petition, in the absence of something
abnormal, inserted in the Act section 6 so that the obligor can
be relieved from extradition if he wishes to stay where he has
found employment and contribute to the support of his obligees
a sum which the court rules is reasonable.3 7
V. INTENT OF THE DRAFTERS
According to the drafters, granting jurisdiction to the obligor
and relieving him from extradition in an ex parte hearing was
definitely not contemplated by the inclusion of Section 6.38 In fact,
the 1958 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
redrafted Section 6 with the express purpose of overturning mis-
interpretations such as those reached in the Jackson and Lefler
cases.39 In an authoritative article written before any court de-
35 344 P.2d 754, 763 (1959).
36 Ibid.
37 344 P.2d 754, 763 (1959) (Emphasis added).
38 Brockelbank, Relief From Extradition Under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 19 MO. L. REV. 191, 195 (1954); Ex relatione
William J. Brockelbank, letter, Oct. 19, 1960. Briggs, Need for Adoption
of the 1958 Amendment to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, 20 MONT. L. REV. 40, 47 (1958): "There is nothing in section
6 [1958], as amended, to suggest the hotly contested discussions which
have gone on in the annual conferences . . . as to just what the policy
should be concerning extradition requests for a 'non-supporter.' The
controversy developed from an amendment to the Uniform Act by Ari-
zona, permitting a defendant there, in effect, to initiate a civil action
against himself in the responding state so as to stay the extradition
proceedings, where the state requesting the extradition failed to begin
a companion civil action. There is no doubt that the Uniform Act did
not contemplate such procedure. Arizona readily recognized this in find-
ing an amendment necessary .... The 1958 form of section 6 makes it
clear that the original idea that the defendant not be allowed any such
recourse has prevailed. . . ." (Emphasis added).
39BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT 15-22
(1960).
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cisions on Section 6, Professor Brockelbank in analyzing Section 6
in light of Section 5 stated:
Section 6 provides that "any obligor contemplated by Section
5 shall be relieved of extradition...." More simply stated this
means that the demanding state shall not extradite obligors who
comply with the support orders of asylum states (pursuant to
Support Act procedures) and conversely asylum states shall not
surrender obligors who comply with support orders of the demand-
ing states.40
Section 6 does not give the obligor the right to submit to the juris-
diction of the court of the asylum state on his initiative and ask
that the court enter a support order with which he can comply in
order to be relieved from extradition. There is no such procedure
in existence and a defendant-obligor cannot initiate such procedure.
Under the present law, there is no feasible way for the asylum
state to enter a proper order of support and quite possibly the
obligee's best interests might not be served.4 1 Further the im-
40Brockelbank, Relief From Extradition Under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 19 MO. L. REV. 191, 194 (1954) (Emphasis
added). The statement quoted is in summary of the following excerpt
from the same page of Professor Brockelbank's article: "There are two
classes of obligors mentioned in section 5: (1) those whom the governor
of this state may be demanding from another state and (2) those whom
the governor of another state may be demanding of this state. Pursuing
this tack to the limits this means, as to the first class (those whom the
governor of this state may be demanding from the governor of another
state) that the governor of this state as a demanding state shall relieve
from extradition, that is shall not extradite, an obligor who submits to
the jurisdiction of the other state, which can only be in this context the
asylum state, and complies with an order of support of a court of that
state. This means as to the second class (those whom the governor of
another state may be demanding of this state) that the governor of this
state as a state on whom a demand is being made shall relieve from ex-
tradition, that is shall not surrender, an obligor who submits to the juris-
diction of the 'other state', this time the demanding state, and complies
with its order of support." (Emphasis added).
41 Id. at 195-196. Cf. Note, 24 U. CINC. L. REV. 139, 141 (1955):
"Thus nowhere in the Act is a procedure set forth in which the
obligor can initiate a support action in the court of the responding state.
The obligor must always be the defendant in a support proceeding."
Briggs, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in Montana, 15
MONT. L. REV. 40, 68 (1954): "The entire wording of Section 6 in
granting the dispensation (avoidance of extradition) assumes a case
where the requested (responding) court is ready to exercise jurisdiction
in the civil action as a matter of course, envisaging the initiating of such
action by the requesting state . . .and presumably limited to that situa-
ation." (Emphasis added).
Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 12, 13 (1952): "Very often an absconding father, when
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munity purchased this way could in many instances violate and
frustrate the purpose of the Support Act. Section 6, then, comes
into play and relieves the obligor from extradition when he is
complying with support order of asylum states when such orders
are the result of regular proceedings under the Support Act in the
court of the asylum state which have been instituted by the obligee
in the initiating state. This is a prohibition on the governor
of the responding state and it protects the obligor who is complying
with an order made in accordance with the procedures of the
Support Act.
42
In view of Professor Brockelbank's interpretation above, the
possible ambiguity of Section 6 is eliminated. It is clear then that
an ex parte hearing instituted by the obligor cannot be the basis
for the court in the responding state to grant jurisdiction.43 Such
was not the "intent of the drafters." Sections 5 and 6 must be
construed together and in this light Section 6 means that the gov-
ernor of the demanding state should not request the surrender
of an obligor who is complying with the support order of a court
in such other state (responding state) and the governor of the
responding state should not surrender an obligor who is complying
with the support order of a court in the demanding state.44 This
follows the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that a statute
must be construed in connection with all other statutory provisions
relating to the same matter.45 In other words, Section 6 when
construed in conjunction with Section 5 and the Support Act's
definition of "responding state" means that the obligor may submit
himself to the responding state court, which by its subsequently
assumed jurisdiction may enter an order of support pursuant to
the Support Act's procedures which involve a prior suit instituted
by the obligee in the initiating state. This protects the obligor
from extradition if he is already complying with a bona-fide
support order entered against him by the demanding state while
he was in the demanding state or a support order entered by a
faced with the possibility of extradition and criminal proceedings, will
submit to the jurisdiction of the court and comply with any reasonable
order of support. He is thereby relieved of extradition." (Under Section
6 after civil proceedings have been instituted by the obligee in the in-
itiating state.)
42 Brockelbank, Relief from Extradition Under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, 19 MO. L. REV. 191, 198 (1954).
43 Id. at 193.
44Id. at 200.
45 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 368 (2d ed. 1921);
Vallely v. First Nat'l Bank of Grafton, 14 N.D. 580, 106 N.W. 127 (1905).
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responding state court pursuant to a prior order of an initiating
state court under Support Act procedures. 46
VI. CONCLUSION
There have been a number of solutions suggested to correct
the apparent ambiguity of Section 6. Arizona, for example, realized
that an obligor could not voluntarily submit himself to the juris-
diction of the responding state court and passed a specific pro-
vision whereby the obligor could come under the jurisdiction of
the responding state court in an ex parte hearing.47 However, the
suspension of extradition is still subject to the governor's discretion.
Minnesota also passed its own provision.48 Section 6 might be com-
46 Brockelbank, supra note 42, at 200.
47 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1655 (1956) provides:
INTERSTATE RENDITION
A. * * * [§ A is identical to Section 5 of the Support Act.]
B. When the extradition of an obligor in this state has been demanded
by the governor of any other state, the obligor may be relieved of
extradition to such other state if he submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court of this state and complies with the court's order of sup-
port. In order to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court of
this state, such obligor shall file with the court a verified petition
containing the following information:
1. His name and permanent address.
2. The names, addresses and ages of his obligees in the demanding
state.
3. His financial circumstances.
4. That he is willing to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
court of this state and to comply with its order of support.
5. Such other information as he believes to be pertinent and material.
C. The court shall make a temporary order of support and shall continue
the matter pending the receipt of such further information as the
court deems necessary or advisable. Two certified copies of the
temporary order of support shall be delivered to the office of the
governor and one plain copy shall be delivered to the county attorney.
Upon receipt of the certified copies of the order of support, the
governor may in his discretion suspend extradition proceedings so
long as the obligor complies with the temporary order of support
and with any other orders of support which may thereafter be entered.
48MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.51 (Supp. 1959) provides:
GOVERNOR, DUTIES, EXTRADITION.
Subdivisions 1, 2, 3. * * * [Identical to Section 5 of the Support Act.]
Subdivision 4. Surrender.
The governor of this state shall neither demand nor grant the
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pletely eliminated; 49 however, safeguards protecting the obligor
from unwarranted extradition would be taken away. The best
solution seems to be that proposed by the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners in their 1958 Amendment to the Support Act.50
Under the amended version of Section 6, the governor of the
initiating state, prior to the demand from the responding state,
may require his own prosecuting attorney to satisfy him that the
obligee has attempted to proceed under the civil provisions of the
Support Act in the prior sixty days; and when a demand is made
on the governor of the responding state, he may delay rendition
until his prosecuting attorney has ascertained whether the obligee
in the initiating state has proceeded under the civil provisions of
surrender of an obligor subject to this section who submits to the
jurisdiction of the court of the responding state,
(1) so long as the obligor complies with an order of that court for
support, or
(2) in the absence of an order for support, while a proceeding for
support is pending in that court.
49 This section is omitted in Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia and Massa-
chusetts.
50UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 6
(1958), 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 32 (Supp. 1959):
§ 6 CONDITIONS OF INTERSTATE RENDITION.
(a) Before making the demand on the Governor of any other state
for the surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime
of failing to provide for the support of any person, the Governor
of this state may require any (prosecuting attorney) of this state
to satisfy him that at least (sixty) days prior thereto the obligee
brought an action for the support under this act, or that the
bringing of an action would be of no avail.
(b) When under this or a substantially similar act, a demand is made
upon the Governor of this state by the Governor of another state
for the surrender of a person charged in the other state with the
crime of failing to provide support, the Governor may call upon
any (prosecuting attorney) to investigate or assist in investigating
the demand, and to report to him whether any action for support
has been brought under this act or would be effective.
(c) If an action for the support would be effective and no action has
been brought, the Governor may delay honoring the demand for
a reasonable time to permit prosecution of an action for support.
(d) If an action for support has been brought and the person demanded
has prevailed in that action, the Governor may decline to honor
the demand.
(e) If an action for support has been brought and pursuant thereto
the person demanded is subject to a support order, the Governor
may decline to honor the demand so long as the person demanded
is complying with the support order.
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the Support Act in the demanding state in the prior sixty days. If
it is determined that an action for support would be effective and
has not been brought or that the person demanded (obligor) has
prevailed or if the person demanded is already subject to a support
order and complying with the order, the governor may decline to
honor the demand.
To avoid possible judicial interpretations such as Lefler v.
Lefler51 and Jackson v. Hall,52 it is suggested that the Nebraska
Legislature adopt Section 6 of the 1958 Support Act. It is also
recommended that the entire 1958 Support Act 53 be studied with
the view of adoption in the interests of uniformity. 4 Not only
would Nebraska be solving the interstate support of dependents
in a uniform manner, but it would be solving the problem in the
manner suggested by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws.
Joseph L. Krause, '62
51344 P.2d 754 (Ore. 1959).
52 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
53 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 30 (Supp. 1959).
54For comprehensive discussions of the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1958), see Kelso, Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 19 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1959); Briggs,
Need for Adoption of the 1958 Amendment to the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 20 MONT. L. REV. 40 (1958).
